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I. The subject and questions of the study 
 
I.1. Definition of Euroscepticism 
 
In recent years, party-based Euroscepticism has become 
one of the hottest topics of not only the media, but also of the po-
litical science. The economic crisis – first of all the crisis of the 
Eurozone – and the strengthening of Eurosceptic parties have con-
tributed to this fact, illustrated for example by the Finnish parlia-
mentary election in 2011, the two Greek legislative elections in 
2012 and the Italian one in 2013. In addition, the issue of the Eu-
ropean integration has become more and more important for both 
parties and voters: it is enough to think of the ratification prob-
lems of the Lisbon Treaty, the fall of the Slovak government in 
2011 because of the voting on the European Financial Stability 
Facility or the restructuring of the Greek party system in 2012. 
However, the topic is not new for political science: politi-
cal scientists have been dealing with Euroscepticism since the 
mid-1990s. Euroscepticism was defined by Paul Taggart (1998) 
for the first time, when he analysed the parties’ positions on the 
European Union. Later the concept was imported to the area of the 
examination of public opinion (Serricchio et al, 2013: 52), and 
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nowadays it is commonly used for all negative attitudes towards 
the EU and the European integration (Boomgaarden et al., 2010). 
I analysed party-based Euroscepticism in my dissertation, 
however, I consider it important to present the other approaches of 
political science. Krouwel and Abts (2007) created their 5 catego-
ries along the trust in the integration, of which – in terms of Euro-
scepticism – the disbelief in the functioning of EU institutions and 
fatalism about the future of the European project (eurocynicism), 
and the full disillusionment and rejection of the integration (euro-
alienation) are relevant (Krouwel and Abts, 2007: 262-263). 
Weßels (2007) classifies Eurosceptic voters into three groups ac-
cording to their level of identification with the European Union 
and the extent of their EU identity. According to him, there are 
adamant Eurosceptics, Eurosceptics and critical Europeans. 
The other dimension of the analysis of voters’ attitudes is 
the exploration of the reasons of Euroscepticism. In this field of 
the researches, the study of Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) played 
a pioneer role. They distinguish political and instrumental Euro-
scepticism. The authors think that the researches on Eurosceptic 
voters focus too much on the latter aspect, namely on voters’ be-
liefs whether their country’s EU membership is beneficial. In op-
position to this, political Euroscepticism means the rejection of 
the EU and any further transfer of power. Sørensen (2007; 2008) 
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differentiates four types of public Euroscepticism: economic, sov-
ereignty-based, democratic and social Euroscepticism. 
I examined party-based Euroscepticism in my dissertation, 
I pay attention to the most important definitional and research 
problems below. As far as the analysis of party-based Euroscepti-
cism is concerned, according to Cas Mudde (2012), basically there 
are two schools. The first approach – called Sussex school by 
Mudde – is related to Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak. Alt-
hough Taggart (1997; 1998) interpreted Euroscepticism as a party 
of a broader populist politics, around the turn of the millennium, 
he and Szczerbiak (2000; 2008) elaborated the most common def-
initions and grouping of Euroscepticism. The authors distinguish 
hard Euroscepticism, referring to the outright rejection of the 
whole European economic and political project or opposing the 
EU membership, and soft Euroscepticism, which means contin-
gent or qualified opposition of the European integration (Szeczer-
biak and Taggart, 2000: 6)  
First serious criticism of this concept was drawn up by Petr 
Kopecký and Cas Mudde (2002). According to them, soft Euro-
scepticism is defined in a broad manner, the distinction between 
hard and soft Euroscepticism is blurred, the criteria of the two 
forms of Euroscepticism are unclear and these two categories do 
not distinguish the relation to the European Union and the relation 
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to the European integration enough. Due to this fourth reason, 
Kopecký and Mudde created another grouping scheme (table 1). 
The authors differentiate the relation to the ongoing integration 
process (EU-optimist, EU-pessimist) and the idea of any European 
integration (Europhile, Europhobe). 
 
Table 1. Grouping of Kopecký and Mudde  
 Europhile Europhobe 
EU-optimist Euroenthusiast Europragmatist 
EU-pessimist Eurosceptic Euroreject 
Source: Kopecký and Mudde, 2002: 303. 
 
Naturally, the category of Euroenthusiast is not a subject 
of the examination of Euroscepticism. It is quite clear as well, that 
the class of Eurosceptic is not principal opposition of the Europe-
an integration, it only refers to some worries about the current 
form of the EU, so this type fits into the category of soft Euro-
scepticism of Taggart and Szczerbiak. On the other hand, the cat-
egory of Euroreject opposes both the European Union and the idea 
of the European integration, so it is not hard to classify it as hard 
Euroscepticism. 
Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008b) see three problems of the 
grouping of Kopecký and Mudde: the category of Eurosceptic is 
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defined in a too narrow way, the class of Europragmatist is illogi-
cal and the category of Euroenthusiast is too broad because there 
are different degrees between the parties that support the current 
integration process. 
As a result, the definitions of Taggart and Szczerbiak be-
come more concrete in 2008. Hard Euroscepticism is the princi-
pled opposition to the EU and European integration. Parties that 
think their countries should withdraw from the EU or ‘whose pol-
icies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed the whole 
project of the European integration as it is currently conceived’. 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008a: 7). Soft Euroscepticism is ‘where 
concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expres-
sion of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense 
that «national interest» is currently at odds with the EU’s trajecto-
ry’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008a: 8). 
In my dissertation, I also present in detail further theories 
related to the Sussex school, such as Flood (2002); Fuchs, Roger 
and Magni-Berton (2009) and Kaniok (2009); however, these 
concepts are not as significant as the above mentioned ones. 
Mudde (2012) considers the other relevant school the 
North Carolina school, which is connected to Leonard Ray. Ray 
(1999) measures Euroscepticism in a seven-grade scale by expert 
surveys. However, he does not define Euroscepticism. Marks et al. 
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(2000; 2002) try to fit Euroscepticism into the cleavage theory 
based on the data base that Ray started to build. Authors belong-
ing to this school came up with the theory that the European 
cleavage is derivable from the opposition of the green-alternative-
liberal and traditional-authoritarian-nationalist standpoints. This 
approach has become the origo of the North Carolina school. I 
think that this theory covers reality poorly critic because there are 
several critics of the European Union among the new left and 
green parties as well, while conservative parties in Scandinavia 
are traditionally in favour of the further deepening of the Europe-
an integration. In addition, this theory does not explain why there 
are a significant number of established Eurosceptic parties and 
Eurosceptic factions within them. 
Nick Sitter (2002) concludes that Euroscepticism can be 
described with the classic divides, which are consequences of the 
parties’ strategies, not – as the North Carolina school states – of 
the parties’ ideologies and programs. Hix (2007) says that the 
phenomenon of Euroscepticism can be perceived as an anti-
centralization effort. Hix expounds that every political actor will 
weigh up whether the EU policy regime is closer to or further 
away from its preferred set of policies and to what direction the 
policy area will change at domestic and European level. In my 
opinion, Eurosceptic parties do not make any cost-benefit anal-
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yses, but – depending on the party – the source of their Euroscep-
ticism is derivable from either its ideology or its strategy. 
It is clear, that there are not any unified definitions about 
Euroscepticism, even any unified approach. Researchers consider 
different parties as Eurosceptic, or they say different things about 
the same parties. The second problem is that researches do not 
aim to explore the reasons (ie. the arguments and their drivers) of 
the Eurosceptic parties, only try to perceive it as one or maximum 
two trends (soft and hard).  
In this context, there is another huge problem in most re-
searches, namely that they make snapshots about the phenomenon 
instead of examination in a historical context within its (domestic) 
environment. What is to say, researches do not deal with the fact 
that both the parties and the European Union are always moving, 
the standpoints are changing and other topics are taking centre 
stage. 
Because of these arguments, I use my own definition on 
Euroscepticism which – in my opinion – defines the phenomenon 
in a much better way. Eurosceptic party is a party which oppose or 
criticise the current European integration, some parts of it, or its 
decision-making process or mechanism, where the criticism is 
basically principal-based, not policy-based. 
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I.2. Types of Euroscepticism 
 
In the dissertation I emphasise the importance of the ar-
guments about the European Union of the Eurosceptic parties. 
This topic does not have as far-reaching literature as the definition 
of the Euroscepticism has, however, its importance cannot be em-
phasised enough. 
Taggart classified Eurosceptic parties according to party 
families, which he identifies with types of Euroscepticism. He 
created four categories: single-issue Eurosceptic parties, protest-
based Eurosceptic parties, established Eurosceptic parties and 
parties with Eurosceptic faction (Taggart, 1997: 11-12). Although 
this classification is relevant, there are debates about party fami-
lies. 
Similarly to Taggart, one of Riishøj’s grouping (2007) is 
focusing on party families. Riishøj concludes that there are three 
types of Eurosceptic parties: liberal conservative (or neo-liberal), 
traditional conservative and left-populist. His other classification 
is much more innovative, though, it does not concentrate on par-
ties. In my opinion, it is important to present it because it focuses 
on the drivers of Euroscepticism. He created nine categories of 
Euroscepticism: identity-based, cleavage-based, policy-based, 
institutionally based, national interest-based, experience-based, 
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party-based, Atlantic-based and practice-based Euroscepticism 
(Riishøj, 2007: 508-509). 
These classifications inspired me to create my own catego-
ries. The second important aim of my research is to examine the 
nature of the reasons with which Eurosceptic parties criticise the 
European Union. In addition, I examined Eurosceptic parties in 
government position, and that whether Euroscepticism changed in 
time – particularly as a result of the crisis of the Eurozone. 
 
II. Applied methodology 
 
The largest part of the dissertation is the empirical part. I 
examined the state, logic and changes of party-based Euroscepti-
cism in all 28 member states. Whereas the research directed on the 
parties, they were my units of observation. I analysed Eurosceptic 
parties that had representation in the national or European Parlia-
ment on October 31
th
 2013. Party programmes was my baseline, 
moreover, parliamentary votings on European issues are available 
in most member states. My data covers the entire population of 
relevant Eurosceptic parties. Research was carried out from the 
foundation of the European Economic Community (1957) in time, 
but only parties above were examined thoroughly. 
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The most important part of the dissertation is the analysis 
of the parties’ relation to federalism. Associated to this, the ap-
propriate indicator has to be chosen. No debate has unfolded yet 
about the indicators of Euroscepticism in the literature, although 
its antecedents are coeval with the literature. Taggart argues in his 
first study on Euroscepticism that the relation to the Maastricht 
Treaty is a good indicator of Euroscepticism because it reap-
praised the European Union, Eurosceptics could express their op-
position this way and general support of the EU declined in public 
opinion (Taggart, 1998: 366-367). I think, Taggart’s suggestion is 
basically good, and this method is useful later as well because of 
the changes of Euroscepticism can be followed easily through 2-3 
treaties within a decade.  
In my opinion, the expert survey used by the North Caroli-
na School is not enough by itself. Data received from the survey – 
beyond that subjectivity cannot be excluded – are unreliable in the 
case of low response rate. 
The most serious question in connection with the indicator 
is its operationalizability. My aim was that the indicator should be 
simple and easily operationalizable (Taggart and Szerzbiak, 
2008b: 246). The examination of party programmes could be mis-
leading: it can happen, that a hard Eurosceptic party moderates 
itself in government or neutralises the European issue and changes 
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its European policy, like the French Communist Party did in 1997 
(Benedetto and Quaglia, 2007: 482; Grunberg, 2008: 42). Similar 
problem could be caused by the analysis of parliamentary votings: 
the two green parties and the People’s Union (VU) in Belgium 
rejected the Nice Treaty simply because they did not feel it Euro-
pean enough (Deschouwer and Van Assche, 2008: 82). ‘Honest’ 
voting can come to the European Parliament, but parties becoming 
relevant that time (e.g. Sweden Democrats, Independent Greeks) 
would be omitted from the research in this case. 
During the research, I relied basically on primary data col-
lection. Most important data were made up by the collection of 
available party programmes and parliamentary votings. In addi-
tion, naturally, I used secondary sources (literature) as well to 
check the primary sources. Moreover, I took into the research 
some parties which do not belong to the population of the purpose 
of illustration, comparison and the historical arc of the dissertation 
by secondary sources. 
Different treaties deepening the European Union – more 
precisely parties’ standpoint on them – create very good bases 
sufficiently dense clues and opportunities for operationaliziation. 
Therefore, classification according to the relation to the federal 
Europe has a benefit because it is always current as the reform of 
the European Union is continuously on the agenda – which cannot 
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be said about the relation to the membership (hard and soft Euro-
scepticism). 
I see the synthesis of the three methods: considering party 
program as a base, I examined the reason if a party did not vote 
according to its party programme. It happened whether the party 
was in government, whether changed its standpoint, or maybe 
some other domestic factor affected it. Kaniok argues that it is 
important to examine parties’ rhetoric (Kaniok, 2009: 166), how-
ever, I dispute this statement. Rhetoric is for voters, but a party 
which supports the deepening of the European integration while 
its leader criticises the European Union in some other issues can-
not be deemed as Eurosceptic. 
The largest part of the dissertation is clearly the empirical 
chapter and it was the basis of the temporal segmentation of the 
Euroscepticism. However, I did not want to avoid the questions 
needing hypotheses. I tried to create hypotheses to complete the 
classification – which was the spine of the research – with rele-
vant information. 
 
H1: Eurosceptic parties moderate their Euroscepticism in 
government. 
 
16 
 
During the testing of the hypothesis, I examined every case 
when a Eurosceptic party was part of the government. I did not 
deal with those cases, when a Eurosceptic party was in govern-
ment before the EU accession. Its reason is that Eurosceptic par-
ties focus much more on the question of membership which could 
be misleading because if a party opposed to join the EU, it does 
not mean that the party is hard Eurosceptic (e.g. Estonian Centre 
Party). Operationalization was made by the way that was used in 
the case of the examination of the classification. 
 
H2: The nature and changes of the European integration 
influence the nature and appearance of Euroscepticism. 
 
In connection with this hypothesis, I primarily supposed 
that new Eurosceptic parties can emerge as an effect of treaties 
deepening the integration or some other events (e.g. economic 
crisis). Conversely: whether existing parties have responded to 
these changes, or perhaps none of these options occurred. In my 
opinion, it is relevant to examine that whether the phenomenon of 
Euroscepticism is constant or continuously changing. During the 
testing of the hypothesis I took into consideration, to what extent 
one or another party thanks its success for Euroscepticism, how 
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emphatic the critique of the European Union has been in its poli-
cy, and what other factors could play a role. 
I closed my dissertation on October 31th 2013, so all par-
liamentary elections organised in 2013 were included in it.  
 
III. The results of the thesis 
 
The primary goal of the dissertation was the solving of the 
problems of definitions and classifications described above. I tried 
to give a complete picture on Eurosceptic parties existing in 
member states. Based on the case studies I state that the most im-
portant difference between Eurosceptic parties is the advocate of 
the intergovernmental cooperation and the support of a tighter 
integration. A special case is formed by those – mainly left-wing – 
parties which do not support the current European integration for 
ideological reasons, but they can imagine another tighter coopera-
tion. 
As a result, three groups of Eurosceptic parties wanting to 
unbuild the European integration can be differentiated. The first 
set – with the smallest number of clusters (cardinality) – is made 
up by hard Eurosceptic parties. Anti-federalist parties in favour of 
intergovernmental cooperation belong to the second. Vast majori-
ty of these parties justify the rejection of a deeper integration with 
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the defence of the national sovereignty. Parties that reject the cur-
rent integration because they consider other values important per-
tain to the third group called supporters of an alternative integra-
tion. In this case, parties oppose not the idea, but the practice of a 
tighter cooperation. Among the Eurosceptic parties which accept 
the general economic and/or political framework (conformist Eu-
rosceptic parties) major differences cannot be found. Basically, 
these parties criticise or reject one (or a number) of typically im-
portant part of the European Union.  
 
Table 2. Classification of Eurosceptic parties (with one example) 
Hard Anti-federalist 
Supporting 
alternative 
integration 
Conformist 
United Kingdom 
Independence 
Party (GB) 
Danish People’s 
Party (DK) 
Coalition of 
Radical Left 
(GR) 
Labour Party 
(M) 
The international car sign of the country within the party exists can be 
found behind the party’s name in parentheses. 
 
As far as the relevance of the classification is concerned, I 
found that there are only 10 significant hard Eurosceptic parties 
existing in the European Union. Out of the 63 analysed parties, 15 
parties are clearly conformist Eurosceptic, in addition, 12 mainly 
left-wing Eurosceptic parties think in terms of another type of 
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integration. There are 26 antifederalist soft Eurosceptic parties in 
my sample. 
During the research I examined with what reasons Euro-
sceptic parties criticise or reject a part of or the whole European 
integration. Based on this, I created five categories. 
Sovereignty-based Euroscepticism means if a party oppos-
es to the integration or a part of it because it impairs its country’s 
sovereignty, or if the national sovereignty and/or the real or per-
ceived occurrence of the national interest’s damage stands in the 
centre of the party’s critique. 
Democracy-based Euroscepticism based on the ‘democra-
cy-deficit’ in the European Union and it is in connection with the 
critiques of the bureaucratic institutions and decision-making. 
Regionalist and separatist parties criticising that the regions are 
excluded from the most important decision-making mechanisms 
belong to this category as well. 
Leftist Euroscepticism rests on two pillars. One of them is 
that anti-capitalist attitude, which aims at socialism or the creation 
of a kind of proletarian union. It is the Marxist-Leninist and Trot-
skyist parties’ own. On the other hand, a kind of leftist Euroscep-
ticism stand out along the new left parties’ classical values (anti-
globalisation, social sensitivity, anti-capitalism in some cases, 
pacifism). 
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Periphery-based Euroscepticism is the critiques of the Eu-
rosceptic parties in the periphery countries of the European Union 
which originate from the fact that these countries are poorer than 
the countries at the centre of the EU. So these parties experience 
the FDI from the centre as colonisation. Usually these parties crit-
icise the decision-making process dominated by France and Ger-
many. In the case of the post-communist countries, it is coupled 
with the fact, that these member states joined the EU later and 
with worse conditions. 
Redistribution-based Euroscepticism is when a party’s cri-
tique against the EU is drawn up by a redistribution issue. On the 
one hand, the source of these criticisms is the fact that some poli-
cy areas have a decreasing share from the EU budget (e.g. Com-
mon Agricultural Policy). Therefore, part of the defenders of these 
policy areas has been interested in the maintenance of the status 
quo. The other subtype of this category has become visible in 
connection with the crisis of the Eurozone. Its essence is that ac-
cording to Eurosceptic parties of richer member states these coun-
tries should not finance the countries in trouble. 
These five categories are illustrated by Table 3. 
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Table 3. Main groups of critiques of Eurosceptic parties 
Sovereignty Democracy Leftist Periphery 
Redistri-
bution 
Conservative 
and Unionist 
Party (GB) 
Environment 
Party – The 
Greens (S) 
French 
Communist 
Party (F) 
Golden 
Dawn (GR) 
Freedom and 
Solidarity 
(SK) 
The international car sign of the country within the party exists can be 
found behind the party’s name in parentheses. 
 
I sectioned Euroscepticism in time based on the country 
studies. I found that the Maastricht Treaty has been the most im-
portant turning point, however, other important events – e.g. East-
ern enlargement starting in 2004 and the crisis of the Eurozone – 
are also major phase borders. Based on this, I differentiated five 
phases of Euroscepticism (Figure 1) 
 
22 
 
Figure 1. Five phases of party-based Euroscepticism 
 
 
In the dissertation, I also examined the behaviour of Euro-
sceptic parties in government. Although in opposition to the 
statement of the hypothesis (H1) – these parties moderate its Eu-
roscepticism in government – I experience moderation only in the 
half of cases, there were other factors which can explain the fact 
that several parties did not give up their Euroscepticism. On the 
one hand, systemconforming Eurosceptic parties would have be-
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come pro-European, if these parties had moderated their Euro-
scepticism. In some cases, it is hard to state sure about Euroscep-
tic parties because of the short government term. I also experience 
in some cases, though there were not moderating, but the party 
simply neutralised the question of European integration in gov-
ernment. 
I found three unequivocal cases against H1 hypothesis. 
The reason in one case is the characteristic Eurosceptic leader. 
During De Gaulle’s presidency, Euroscepticism gained ground in 
France, followed by moderation after the fall of the leader: they 
accepted the British, Danish and Irish intention to join the Com-
munity. In the other two cases (Northern League 2001-06, Con-
servative Party 2010-), Euroscepticism has appeared as a deter-
mining part of the party’s character. The anti-euro attitude and 
Euroscepticism of the Northern League became more emphatic in 
the years of millennium. If they had abandoned Euroscepticism, it 
would have led to the loss of the party’s identity. It is similar to 
the British Conservative government standing up in 2010. Prime 
minister David Cameron has been trying to take the European 
issue on of the most important topic, moreover, Tories hade to 
emphasise their Euroscepticism because lots of its voters started to 
support UKIP. 
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In connection with the second hypothesis (H2), it was nec-
essary to examine whether on the one hand, the nature of Euro-
scepticism changed and, on the other hand, whether Eurosceptic 
parties could respond to the changes caused by the European inte-
gration, or these changes contributed to successes of new Euro-
sceptic parties. I found that arguments of Eurosceptic parties have 
changed partly, emphases can shift, however, the ‘core’ of Euro-
scepticism consists of the same arguments (sovereignty, anti-
capitalism, social dimension, democracy-deficit). As a result of 
the Eastern enlargement, periphery-based Euroscepticism has 
come into view not only in new member states, but also in South-
ern-European countries. Due to the economic and debt crisis, the 
situation of the redistribution-based Euroscepticism is very similar 
within the Eurozone. 
Appearance of Euroscepticism has also changed: single-
issue Eurosceptic parties are decreasing, while new parties (e.g. 
Team Stronach) have broken into the political arena along one (or 
a number of) question of the European integration. Basically, 
those Eurosceptic parties could become successful, which could 
find any new European issue (e.g. anti-euro). When they did not 
do this, the key of their success was the fact that their Eurosceptic 
rivals have been radical parties unacceptable for some groups of 
the voters. There are also new Eurosceptic parties, whose success 
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has not been only due to their Euroscepticism, but also due to the 
protest mood (e.g. Five Star Movement). 
The research could be continued – besides extending it be-
yond the borders of the EU – into two directions. One of them is 
the change of the salience of the European issue. It could show 
what role Euroscepticism played in the success of the party. The 
other dimension could be the change of the voters’ relation to the 
European integration. In connection with it, a hypothesis can be 
drawn up: European issue is increasingly important for voters. In 
other words: they are increasingly willing to vote along the Euro-
pean issue. At the examination of the voters’ level, referenda 
could be involved into the research as well. 
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